



The Urgency of Reorganizing Disaster Management Institutions in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

A disaster management institutional system is always related to three main issues: power, justice, and legitimacy. In Indonesia, the main problems in disaster management institutions are: first, many institutions are directly involved and even act as leading actors, but do not cooperate; and second, because there are too many institutions involved, coordination problems arise among them. These issues have resulted in disaster management becoming fragmented and ineffective. To address this gap, this article introduces a structured analytical framework that classifies three alternative disaster management institutional arrangements – single-agency system, multi-agency system, and collaborative crisis management. This article advances the discourse by offering a normative and comparative legal analysis that has not been comprehensively applied in the Indonesian context. It analyzes the comparison of institutional systems in the United States and China to develop a new institutional perspective, providing actionable pathways for legal and organizational reform. This article argues that the historical involvement of numerous institutions shapes the dynamics of inter-institutional relations, leading to overlapping authority and heightened sectoral ego, thereby making coordination increasingly challenging. Therefore, this article provides a normative framework that serves as a foundation for enhancing coordination, strengthening institutional legitimacy, and improving the overall effectiveness of disaster management in Indonesia.

Keywords: Disaster Management Institution, Reorganization, Single-Agency System, Multi-Agency System, Collaborative Crisis Governance.

INTRODUCTION

The implementation of disaster management in Indonesia, whether natural, non-natural, or social, cannot be separated from 3 (three) main issues: *power, justice, and legitimacy* (Wignyo, 2018, p. 12). These 3 (three) things are very relevant if contextualized with the disaster management institution, where *power* is related to the organizing institution as a state representative in responding to disaster; then *justice* is related to how the institution functions to reduce the suffering of disaster victims; lastly, *legitimacy* is related to public trust and the legal basis or regulations underlying the institution's duties, authorities, and functions (Wignyo, 2018, p. 12).

When looking at how disaster management has been carried out in Indonesia so far, the author identifies 2 (two) main problems, namely, problems related to authority and those related to coordination. These two problems are closely related and are the main reasons why disaster management in Indonesia often encounters obstacles and ultimately operates ineffectively.

First, based on Law Number 24 of 2007 on Disaster Management (DMR), which is still the legal umbrella for the implementation of disaster management in Indonesia (Hizbaron et al., 2018, p. 79), the Central Government and Local Governments hold the primary responsibility for the implementation of disaster management as stated in Article 5, through the *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB)* at the national level as indicated in Article 10 paragraph (10). As stated in Article 18 paragraph (1), the *Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (BPBD)* is responsible at the regional level. In addition to these institutions, DMR does not explicitly regulate other institutions' involvement in disaster management implementation. Still, in reality, many institutions are either directly or indirectly involved, for example, the *Badan Nasional Pencarian dan Pertolongan (BASARNAS)*, the *Pusat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geologi (PVMBG)*, the *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT)*, and the



Palang Merah Indonesia (PMI), and various ministries such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Transportation, took a role in disaster management (Pratama & Gischa, 2020). What is more intriguing about this matter is that many of those institutions taking on the leading actor role ultimately degrade BNPS's role, especially in handling non-natural and social or man-made disasters.

Basically, the DMR does not differentiate between handling natural, non-natural, and social disasters. Thus, there is a tendency for all provisions in the DMR to apply to all types of disasters. However, for a social disaster, such as social conflicts, they are handled by an *ad hoc* institution of the Social Conflict Resolution Task Force based on Law Number 7 of 2012 on Social Conflict Handling, with the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs as the leading actor (Arsil & Ayuni, 2020, p. 439). Another type of social disaster that another institution handles is the act of terrorism based on Law Number 5 of 2018 on Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the Criminal Acts of Terrorism into Law (Terrorism Law), that mandates the *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* (BNPT) as the leading actor. Furthermore, non-natural disasters, such as pandemics, are explicitly regulated in Law Number 6 of 2018 on Health Quarantine, in which the Ministry of Health leads operations (Arsil & Ayuni, 2020, p. 439).

At this point, the author understands that the specialization related to the handling of social and non-natural disasters is a result of the characteristics and complexity of the events classified into these types of disasters, so that if separated, it can reduce the workload of BNPB, which throughout the year deals with natural disasters, which have a higher frequency compared to other types of disasters. For example, according to BNPB's annual report, 3,472 natural disasters occurred through 2024 (Rosyida et al., 2025, p. vi). However, in the handling of natural disasters itself, other institutions have a central role whose authority overlaps with BNPB, one of which is related to the implementation of disaster mitigation and policy-making, namely the *Pusat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geologi* (PVMBG), which is an agency under the auspices of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources based on Presidential Regulation Number 97 of 2021 on the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. The number of institutions that are actively involved and even play a unique and central role raises questions about the position and function of BNPN, as stipulated in the DMR, in implementing disaster management in Indonesia.

Second, the consequences of the many institutions involved in implementing disaster management, as described above, stem from the coordination problems they create. This problem is clearly seen in the early days of handling the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, where the Ministry of Health, which became the leading actor in managing that situation, experienced miscoordination with BNPB as a leading actor in disaster management as a whole regarding data synchronization and the development of COVID-19 cases in Indonesia, which indirectly caused the government to take the wrong policy (Biro Komunikasi dan Informasi Publik, 2020) in controlling the spread of the virus (Santia, 2020; Wadhana, 2020).

According to Article 13 paragraph (1) DMR, as an institution that coordinates in a planned, integrated, and comprehensive manner in implementing disaster management, BNPB should ideally be able to lead and guide the handling of disasters not only during a pandemic but also when any disaster strikes Indonesia. This function is challenging to implement due to the unclear relationship between the BNPB and other institutions within the institutional system (hierarchy), and the absence of solid legitimacy for the BNPB to lead these institutions in disaster response. Therefore, it is necessary to review Indonesia's disaster management system, from its institutional structure to its coordination mechanisms, so that disaster management can be implemented effectively and adaptively.

To address these issues, this paper will explain, *first*, how the legal reality of the many institutions involved and the potential overlapping authority in the implementation of disaster management in Indonesia, to illustrate the urgency of reorganizing clearly; *second*, the choices of institutional systems that can be considered for use, namely single-agency system, multi-agency system, and collaborative crisis governance; and *third*, which among the options that more feasible to apply in Indonesia's disaster management institutional system.



THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Before elaborating on the study's findings, the author should provide prior studies and theoretical frameworks to clarify key terminology, synthesize major theoretical perspectives, and identify gaps or tensions in the existing literature.

Key Terms

Disaster

Early scholars, such as Charles Fritz, defined a disaster as a localized, time-bound event that disrupts the essential operations of society (Fritz, 1957, p. 6). Quarantelli further elaborated on disasters as unexpected, socially disruptive events that require unplanned, adaptive responses (Borgatta & Montgomery, 2000, p. 682). More recently, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) defines a disaster as a severe disruption of the functioning of a community or society due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability, and capacity (Secretary-General, 2016). This definition emphasizes the multidimensional impacts on human, material, economic, and environmental systems and recognizes that disasters often exceed local capacities, necessitating broader coordination across jurisdictions (Secretary-General, 2016).

The term disaster is sometimes used interchangeably with: crisis, which means a sudden, abnormal situation with limited scope (Darling, 1994, pp. 3–8); and emergency that denotes a broader and potentially escalating situation requiring coordinated action (Alexander, 2017, p. 158), even though each carries distinct implications for public policy and legal regulation (Al-Dahash et al., 2016, pp. 1191–1200). In Indonesia, these terminologies are inconsistently used in legal and policy instruments, leading to interpretative ambiguities that may affect institutional responses (Adhari, 2019, p. 43). This paper will focus only on the “disaster” term as stated in DMR.

Disaster Management

Disaster management constitutes a continuous and cyclical process encompassing four interrelated stages: *first*, mitigation that aims to reduce or eliminate the potential consequences of hazards; *second*, preparedness that involves equipping communities and institutions to minimize losses and enhance survival; *third*, response that focuses on immediate actions to mitigate the impact of ongoing disasters; and *fourth*, recovery that aim to restores social and economic systems to customary conditions, often requiring extended periods and inter-institutional coordination (Haddow et al., 2007, p. 8).

These stages illustrate the multi-dimensional nature of disaster management and highlight the necessity for well-defined institutional roles and coordination mechanisms. The involvement of multiple agencies often leads to fragmentation, overlapping authorities, and coordination failures that require study through the lens of institutional theory.

Theoretical Foundations

Legal Politics

Legal politics refers to the state's policy choices concerning which laws are enacted, implemented, or reformed to achieve national objectives (Rahardjo, 1991, p. 352). This perspective enables the analysis of how political, social, and economic contexts shape the institutional architecture of disaster management.

Separation of Powers and Inter-Institutional Relations

The separation of powers, both horizontal (legislative, executive, and judicial) and vertical (central and local), forms the backbone of Indonesia's constitutional framework (Hamja, 2020, p. 986). Within this system, five forms of inter-institutional relations exist, namely functional, supervisory, dispute-resolution, accountability, and membership relations (Arifin et al., 2004, pp. 70–72). These relationships illustrate the complexity of institutional interaction, particularly in disaster management, where multiple agencies overlap in authority.

Reorganizing Theory

According to Shukrullaev, reorganization refers to structural changes that alter institutional forms and legal status (Rakhmonov, 2022, pp. 248–253). Scholars such as Ingraham and Peters differentiate reorganization (structural change) from reform (procedural change), though both involve adaptation to new political and administrative environments (Ingraham & Peters, 1988, p. 10).

There are three models of reorganization: *first*, purposive models that emphasize political motivations; *second*, environmental models that highlight adaptive responses to external pressures; and *third*, institutional models that integrate both by focusing on organizational values and legitimacy (Peters, 1992, pp. 199–217). In Indonesia, persistent institutional proliferation and resistance to reform reflect the political and bureaucratic constraints inherent in the reorganization process. (Peters, 1992)



Existing studies on disaster management in Indonesia predominantly focus on operational challenges or community-based resilience, but rarely integrate institutional analysis with legal and political perspectives. The current literature often treats coordination failures as administrative or technical problems rather than as symptoms of deeper institutional design issues. This study seeks to fill this gap by applying theories of legal politics and institutional reorganization to examine how institutional relationships shape the effectiveness and legitimacy of disaster governance in Indonesia.

By situating the research within these theoretical frameworks, this chapter not only clarifies conceptual boundaries and synthesizes prior scholarship but also positions the study as a contribution to the development of a more coherent, adaptive, and accountable institutional design for disaster management.

METHOD

This study adopts a normative legal research method to analyze legal theories, principles, and structures while also exploring the dynamics of disaster management regulation in Indonesia. The research is descriptive, aiming to assess the level of synchronization and consistency among laws and regulations related to disaster management, particularly regarding the forms of institutional relationships and coordination mechanisms, and how these factors influence disaster response and management processes. At the same time, it is prescriptive, offering insights and recommendations on ideal institutional arrangements and coordination models that could be considered or implemented in Indonesia.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Indonesia is highly prone to disasters. According to the World Risk Index (WRI), Indonesia ranks second among countries most at risk of disasters (Frege et al., 2023, p. 6), including natural disasters such as hydrometeorological (such as floods, hurricane, droughts etc. are the most frequent disasters with the highest number of affected victims) and geophysical (such as earthquakes and tsunami that have higher intensity, causing the highest number of casualties) events, as well as volcanic eruptions (Djalante, 2017, p. 447). And social disasters such as social conflict and terrorism, or non-natural disasters such as pandemics. Therefore, the state is responsible for reducing the risks and impacts of these threats to people's lives and livelihoods by systematically and thoroughly organizing disaster management functions.

Disaster management is a conceptual framework encompassing several aspects, namely regulation, planning, institutional arrangements, budgeting, capacity building, and disaster management implementation (Shalih & Nugroho, 2021, p. 127). In Indonesia itself, problems related to regulations and institutions are urgent issues that the author believes should be discussed, especially regarding the forms of institutions used and the mechanisms for coordinating among institutions.

The Legal Reality of The Many Institutions Involved in Disaster Management in Indonesia

Disaster affairs are the business of all parties (multi-stakeholders), as exemplified by the Penta helix approach, which involves the government, academics, the business world, the community, and the media (Shalih & Nugroho, 2021, p. 127). Because of this large number of parties, a command and coordination system is needed, even though it does not guarantee smooth implementation, especially if the paradigm regarding the implementation of disaster management is viewed as a sectoral aspect and fragmented, which, unfortunately, is also one of the main problems in Indonesia's disaster management institutions.

The number of institutions involved in the implementation of disaster management results in complexity and overlapping, which can lead to 3 (three) main impacts: *First*, it creates ambiguity and potential "legal inconsistencies" between the norms and rules of different institutions that can hinder compliance by those who are the object of the regulations; *second*, it blurs the lines of responsibility for actions and outcomes and increase the likelihood of unintended consequences that ultimately make it burdensome to control the governance process and difficult to determine which relevant parties are responsible, and this can undermine the legitimacy of existing arrangements; and *third*, it opens up opportunities for power holders to adjust which institutions they prioritize to administer a particular affair as their strategic priorities, vision and mission, and policy direction change (Haftel & Lenz, 2022, p. 324). If the institution previously designated to administer the matter feels undercut, the effectiveness of governance may be reduced, and the *status quo* of the institution's arrangements may be changed.

One example of a case that shows the weakness of the current institutional system for organizing



disaster management is at the beginning of handling the COVID-19 pandemic, where there was a difference in understanding between BNPB and the Ministry of Health, which, based on Law Number 6 of 2018 on Health Quarantine, became the leading actor in handling the pandemic. There were differences in the data on the development of COVID-19 pandemic cases reported by both parties, because the BNPB considered the Ministry of Health had withheld the data (Wadhana, 2020). This situation ultimately led to inappropriate decision-making and policies. The lack of coordination and synergy between institutions was also prominent again when the Ministry of Health issued a Large-Scale Social Restriction (Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar or PSBB) policy whose guidelines were contained in Minister of Health Regulation Number 9 of 2020 on Guidelines for Large-Scale Social Restriction in the Context of Accelerating the Handling of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), where gradual easing was carried out after seeing the impact on people's welfare which continued decline (Faturahman, 2021, pp. 77–78). However, the Ministry of Home Affairs views that the PSBB policy is still too early because, until early 2021, there has been no decrease in the number of cases, so it issued a policy of Enforcing Restrictions on Community Activities (Pemberlakuan Pembatasan Kegiatan Masyarakat or PPBM) to replace PSBB through Home Affairs Ministerial Instruction Number 1 of 2021 on the Enforcement of Restrictions on Activities to Control the Spread of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (Faturahman, 2021, p. 78).

There are several more situations in which inter-agency coordination during disaster management implementation fails. There is no synergy or integration among the institutions involved, and some even undermine BNPB's role as the leading actor in disaster management. For example, the Social Conflict Resolution Task Force, which is based on Article 98 paragraph (1) Government Regulation Number 2 of 2015 on Implementing Regulations of Law Number 7 of 2012 on Social Conflict Handling, appoints the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs as the leading actor (coordinator and initiator) meanwhile BNPB only act as the regular member of the task force. Then, the involvement of the Indonesian Red Cross (Palang Merah Indonesia or PMI), which often operates independently with its own facilities and logistical support without coordination, leads to an unbalanced distribution of aid (oversupply or undersupply) (Kusumastuti et al., 2010).

Adding to the list, the Ministry of Social Affairs' idea to concretize the content material on counter-terrorism in the DMR, considering the nature of the act of terrorism, which is part of a social disaster, raises questions about the competence, authority, and limitation of the BNPB in countering terrorism, which already has its specialized agency, the National Counterterrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme or BNPT), as stated in Article 1 number 1 and 2 of Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2010 on the National Counterterrorism Agency (Farisa & Meiliana, 2021). Moreover, according to Article 35B paragraph (1) of the Terrorism Law, regarding the handling of victims, they have been handled by the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban or LPSK), therefore, if this suggestion is approved, without proper harmonization, the potential for overlapping authority between agencies will be high.

Based on the realities mentioned above, the author argues that institutional reorganization of disaster management is needed to minimize the impact of the large number of institutions involved and, most importantly, to ensure that disaster management is carried out promptly.

Institutional Options for Disaster Management in Indonesia

One factor that can determine the effective implementation of disaster management is the institutional system used. In general, three System models can be used: single-agency, multi-agency, and collaborative crisis governance (CCG). Each system has advantages, disadvantages, and consequences when applied in Indonesia, so it is necessary to understand how these systems work and provide factual examples of their application before deciding whether to use or adopt them.

Single-Agency System

The single-agency system integrates various functions related to a single affair into a specialized agency to provide intensive, high-quality services at low cost (Goiâna-da-Silva et al., 2024, p. 2). This system creates a clear "identity" and produces coherent policy and program priorities that can be easily communicated to the agency. Decision-making mechanisms can be carried out relatively quickly because, on the one hand, implementation is faster when coordination is easier, as it tends to be within the same agency (Kovacic & Hyman, n.d., p. 534). A simple example of a single-agency institutional system is shown in Figure 1.

One example of implementing a single-agency system in disaster management is the United States.

Initially, disaster management in the United States involved more than 100 agencies, ranging from federal agencies to the military and private sectors (McNabb & Swenson, 2022, p. 12). Finally, on 1 April 1979, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was formed by combining various federal agencies and their disaster management functions (Pinkowski, n.d., p. 39). Since FEMA's first reorganization in 1992, which elevated its status to cabinet level with direct links to both the President and Congress, and implemented the "*all hazard, all phases*" concept (Roberts, 2006, p. 21). However, since the 9/11 incident in 2001, the institutional paradigm for organizing disaster management in the United States has changed.




Figure 1. Example of a Single Scheme of Disaster Management Organizing Institution with Single-Agency System

After the 9/11 incident in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created, combining 22 agencies and more than 180.000 employees, including FEMA (Roberts, 2006, pp. 46–47). However, this reorganization created a new problem for disaster management institutions in the United States: DHS was overly focused on terrorism, neglecting other disaster management (Roberts, 2006, p. 60). In addition, FEMA staff's response to the reorganization, which saw it no longer occupy a cabinet-level position and lose its authority to deal directly with the President and Congress, led to many senior and experienced staff deciding to retire early, taking their resources with them and ultimately hampering the delivery of disaster management, particularly natural disaster responses (Roberts, 2006, p. 60).

FEMA had to bear the most significant institutional consequences after merging with DHS, including competing with 21 other federal agencies for departmental funding and sharing, and even transferring resources to other agencies, ultimately eroding FEMA's role in organizing disaster management (Hall, 2012, p. 39). As a result, when Hurricane Katrina hit the states of Louisiana and Mississippi in 2005, communication between the states and FEMA became stretched and confusing due to additional layers of bureaucracy (Hall, 2012, p. 39). Learning from the response to Hurricane Katrina, DHS restored FEMA's previously degraded authority, including the authority to communicate directly with the President and Congress and manage its resources, but still under DHS (Haddow et al., 2007, p. 24).

What FEMA experienced after merging with DHS illustrates the shortcomings and consequences agencies face in the single-agency system. Although it has many shortcomings, it is effective in mobilizing competent personnel in the emergency response period, and distributing large amounts of relief supplies evenly in a short time is also a success and an advantage in this system because it is under one command, so that control and coordination are more accessible (Miskel, 2006, p. 123). Based on this discussion, the author has conducted a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) Analysis as a basis for consideration of whether this system should be adopted or implemented, as shown in Table 1.



Table 1. SWOT Analysis of The Possible Implementation of the Single-Agency System

STRENGHT	WEAKNESS	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Budget efficiency; 2. Easier control and coordination; 3. Very low potential overlap; 4. High stability and adaptability; 5. No confusion regarding who is responsible or the leading actor in handling the situation, resulting in a rapid response. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The burden on the institution is enormous because the scope of its functions and authority is vast; 2. There are bound to be one or two functions that receive less attention. 3. Bureaucracy and administration are bloated or multi-layered. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A strong legal basis or mandate to carry out its duties and functions; 2. Sufficient authority and capacity to control and oversee matters related to its functions; 3. High-quality resources (including budget and staff/employees). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Resistance from institutions; 2. Uneven focus on handling each type of disaster; 3. Higher potential for abuse of authority and criminal acts, like corruption.

Multi-Agency System

Unlike the single-agency system, which centralizes disaster management functions within a single agency, the multi-agency system involves two or more agencies, each focusing on a single function or expertise (Wibawa et al., 2021, p. 6). Thus, various functions in disaster management can be explicitly assigned to institutions based on their capacities, resources, and expertise, thereby enhancing the system's legitimacy and resilience. Especially those related to the transfer of power, because making a decision or policy requires the involvement of many parties (Kovacic & Hyman, n.d., p. 531).

Four schemes are commonly used to describe inter-agency relationships in multi-agency systems: centralization, closure, brokerage, and core/periphery (Nowell et al., 2018, p. 702). The details of the schemes are shown in Figure 2.

A multi-agency system in disaster management organizations exists in China. Their emphasis is on organizing disaster management, namely, a coordination system led by the most experienced institution that has already handled the disaster, for example, for flood disasters coordinated by the Ministry of Water Resources, or for industrial accidents coordinated by the State Administration of Work Safety (Lu & Han, 2019, p. 1429). If the disaster is more complex or caused by two or more agents, the organization will be led by the National Management Office (NEMO) under the State Council (Lu & Han, 2019, p. 1429). Another exciting thing about how the multi-agency is implemented in China is that it is accompanied by the application of the “One Planning Plus Three Systems” concept, namely: *First*, one emergency response plan prepared by the Central Government and coordinating various ministries and departments to make derivative emergency response plans following their respective functions and capacities; *second*, standardizing the governance of emergency management; *third*, create an institutional management system by taking into account elements, namely centralized leadership, integrated coordination, categorized governance, multilevel responsibility and governance at the local level; and *fourth*, a regulatory system or mechanism that includes prevention/mitigation and preparedness, monitoring and warning, response and rescue, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and evaluation phases (Zhe et al., 2016, pp. 3–4).




Figure 2. Schematic of Inter-Agency Relationships in a Multi-Agency System

Although the multi-agency system is said to be an ideal system for organizing disaster management, it should be noted that with the many tasks that must be carried out in the governance of disaster management, there is the potential for overlapping policies that can lead to conflicts between institutions due to the sectoral ego of each institution (Kovacic & Hyman, n.d., p. 532). Therefore, the hierarchical relationship and coordination between institutions are important elements for the multi-agency system to run optimally. In addition, because the budget will not be as effective as a single-agency system, each agency developed its own budget system or planning process.

Based on this discussion, the author has conducted a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) Analysis as a basis for consideration of whether this system should be adopted or implemented, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. SWOT Analysis of The Possible Implementation of the Multi-Agency System

STRENGHT	WEAKNESS	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
1. Each institution has higher-quality expertise, knowledge, and resources because it focuses on one function, resulting in a more accurate response;	1. Inefficient budget; 2. greater potential for conflict, overlapping authority, and/or policies between institutions; 3. more difficult coordination and communication; 4. <i>ad hoc</i> institutions, resulting in disaster management not being carried out on a sustainable basis.	1. Clarifying the hierarchy, position, duties, functions, and limits of authority between the institutions involved; 2. establishing a clear and focused coordination system and process.	1. The sectoral egos of each large institution; 2. conflict between institutions due to a lack of unity of purpose and understanding between them; 3. competing interest or shifting responsibility.
2. greater legitimacy and resistance to charge or transfer of power;			
3. disaster management is carried out holistically.			

Collaborative Crisis Governance

Rather than calling it a separate system, Collaborative Crisis Governance (CCG) is more suitable for optimizing the multi-agency system used by a country's disaster management institutions, as CCG almost certainly involves many agencies, so that the multi-agency system and CCG cannot be separated. CCG is the key to starting a multi-agency system.

There are four variables in the CCG concept that can affect the outcome of the collaboration: *first*, starting conditions or initial conditions that can affect the course of the collaboration, namely unequal positions or resources (power/resource imbalance) between the institutions involved, then the contributions made, and the incentives obtained by each (incentive to participate), and the history of conflict and cooperation that has been carried out between institution before; *second*, facilitative



leadership, leadership variables are needed to facilitate all parties in the work area, establish and maintain ground rules, build trust, and mediate when conflict occurs, to explore mutual benefits. This variable is crucial, especially if the initial conditions of each institution are problematic or not ideal; *third*, Institutional Design, which refers to the protocol or legal basis as legitimacy in carrying out collaboration; and *fourth*, collaborative process or collaboration process carried out in a cycle, starting from direct face-to-face dialogue, building trust between each other, building commitment to collaboration, and building understanding and common goals (Ansell & Gash, 2008, pp. 549–4560).

In the collaboration process, if in the process of building understanding, the institutions have different goals or forget their original purpose to collaborate, which ultimately creates potential conflict and hinders collaboration, then the dialogue process, which is the first process described, will be essential to do, and so on until each party in the collaboration can work together and get the desired results. In more detail, the entire CCG concept is shown in Figure 3.

Based on the description above, the author can conclude that the SWOT analysis shown in Table 3 applies.

Table 3. SWOT Analysis of The Possible Implementation of the Multi-Agency System

STRENGHT	WEAKNESS	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Optimizing the multi-agency system; 2. synergizing various agencies involved in policy-making or decision-making; 3. facilitating the various interests of the agencies involved; 4. suppressing the egos of each agency involved. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The process cannot be carried out briefly and must be continuous; 2. susceptibility to manipulation by parties in higher positions or with greater authority; 3. the level of participation is highly dependent on the benefits that each party can obtain. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Building trust, commitment, and understanding among the institutions involved; 2. equalizing positions and breaking down stereotypes that can hinder the collaboration process; 3. inter-institutional dialogue is conducted in good faith and regularly. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. There is a history of conflict between institutions, making collaboration difficult; 2. each institution has too much ego; 3. When a disaster occurs, collaboration may not work well.




Figure 3. Schematic for Running the Collaborative Crisis Governance System

The Most Feasible Option to Use or Adopt in Indonesia

Before deciding which institutional system is most feasible to adapt in Indonesia, several indicators assessing an institution's adaptability and effectiveness should be considered. *First*, persistence, which means institutional structures are not prone to rapid or continuous change; *second*, purposefulness means having an understanding of the mandate given in accordance with the objectives and principles of the core policy; *third*, information, richness, and sensitivity related to storing and updating information from time to time, including in the distribution of appropriate use of information; *forth*, inclusiveness, referring to access to relevant stakeholders, which is achieved by maintaining public participation in policies ranging from operational management to national policy; and *fifth*, flexibility, that implies clear goals, flexible, and continuous to adapt and learn (Goodin, 1996, pp. 39–43).

Based on those indicators and the options above, also paying attention to the institutional condition in Indonesia as a whole, and specifically related to the implementation of disaster management, the author argues that the government should consider implementing a multi-agency system more firmly, and more specifically, with a mixed scheme between the centralization scheme and the intermediary scheme, and during the governance of disaster management implementation must apply the CCG concept to reduce the sectoral ego of each agency involved (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Alternative Scheme for Organizing Disaster Management Institutions with Multi-Agency System and Collaborative Crisis Governance

This option is wiser than forcing the unification of various institutions and disaster management functions scattered across multiple institutions into a single institution, which seems very difficult given strong institutional resistance and the many interests involved.

With that scheme, the government can organize and adjust the position of each institution according to its functions, duties, and desired hierarchy and relationship. Although there is no guarantee that the scheme will perform better than other schemes or the current system, the government must be careful in determining which steps to take to improve Indonesia's disaster management organization's governance and institutional framework, because whatever choice is made has consequences.

The government cannot wait until extraordinary events, disasters, or other emergencies occur to test the systems it has in place to uncover existing shortcomings, then form *ad hoc* institutions or issue policies that negate existing rules on the grounds of emergencies. Although this is most likely inevitable, at least the government can adopt a more adaptive system so that, if faced with a situation never encountered before, it is no longer confused and only needs to make minor adjustments. Disaster management is highly dependent on the speed of response to reduce the more severe impacts. The speed at which handling is provided depends on the institutional system established by the government.

CONCLUSION

The number of institutions involved, both directly and indirectly, in Indonesia's Disaster Management Implementation creates coordination and communication issues between institutions, making it more challenging to carry out, so that overlapping authorities and policies, miscommunication, and miscoordination often occur, as happened during the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, which ultimately confused the public. Therefore, reorganization is needed to create an institutional system that is adaptive and effective in responding to all types of disasters.

In general, three system options can be considered: single-agency systems, multi-agency systems, and collaborative crisis governance. Of these three options, the most likely to be implemented in Indonesia is a multi-agency system combined with collaborative crisis governance, as the institutional framework for implementing disaster management has already been established and involves many parties. Suppose it is merged, combined, or united into a single extraordinary institution (a single-agency



system). In that case, various new problems will arise, primarily related to the budget for filling employee formations, which are definitely full of conflicts of interest that further hamper the implementation of disaster management.

Because of that, for the institutional system of disaster management organizers in Indonesia to run effectively and adaptively, the Government, both the DPR – in this case, Commission VIII – together with other relevant ministries and institutions, especially BNPB, ministries that are included in the steering committee of BNPB, BNPT, BMKG, Basarnas, PMI, to the TNI and Polri, must carry out dialogues and studies, especially those related to institutional forms, coordination flow, to limit the authority and role of each party to reduce the potential for overlap and sectoral ego.

Not only the Government but the community is also expected to encourage increased effectiveness in the implementation of disaster management and adaption in the face of all types of threats by increasing studies, public discussions, and issuing critical notes related to the current institutional system for organizing disaster management, with the hope of raising awareness about the urgency and importance of this issue throughout the community. If awareness in the community has been built, the issue becomes familiar. Finally, the urgency of changes in the institutional system for organizing disaster management is also increasing. They can increase the pressure on the Government to immediately re-discuss the DRM Bill, which was stopped.

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